Обама и внешняя политика Турции

[Sari Galin]

How will Obama’s presidency affect Turkish foreign policy?

by

CENAP ÇAKMAK

Newly elected US President Barack Obama may have a structural impact upon Turkish foreign policy if, as he promised in his campaign, he promotes a multilateral world, complying with international law and relying on negotiations and peaceful means rather than coercion in resolving global problems.

This impact may go beyond isolated issues, including Cyprus, Armenian genocide claims and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorism, and be rather determinative and comprehensive. Obama’s presidency may resolve the dilemma that Turkish foreign policy has had to deal with since the 1980s with respect to its Westernization policy. This may further help Turkey expand the boundaries of its foreign policy and create fertile ground for Turkish foreign policy makers where foreign policy decisions will be made smoothly.

Even though it is possible that bilateral relations between Turkey and the US might have trouble with respect to the Cyprus problem and Armenian genocide issue during Obama’s term in office, Turkey’s cooperation with the US and the EU in transatlantic relations and actions by the UN will make great contributions to Turkish foreign policy. Obama’s foreign policy design, which places greater emphasis on cooperation and negotiation rather than reliance on coercion, may alleviate the tension caused by Turkey’s ambivalence between its Western-oriented policy and its eagerness to preserve the status quo for the sake of protecting its territorial integrity and maintaining security.

Turkish foreign policy tradition

Although it may be problematic to make generalizations about some visible principles governing Turkish foreign policy, it is yet possible to argue that at least two basic principles and goals have remained top-priority items on the agendas of Turkish foreign policy makers since the foundation of the republic. Preservation of the status quo -- for security reasons and maintaining territorial integrity -- and Westernization have remained the primary goals of this policy -- though they have taken different forms and been expressed in different discourses.

In the aftermath of the War of Independence, Turkish foreign policy makers, who assumed that the international order established by the Treaty of Versailles would not be consented to by the defeated powers in World War I and that it was not based on a solid ground, set a goal by which they would seek to ensure the preservation of the status quo in the region surrounding Turkey. This goal is best articulated in a famous motto of Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey: “Peace at home, peace in the world.” This motto delivers a message indicating that Turkey was satisfied with what it had after the fulfillment of the National Covenant (Misak-ı Milli) and that it was expecting consent and respect from the international community for these gains.

Westernization also emerged as another primary foreign policy objective of the young republic. To this end, Turkey maintained ties with France and Britain despite having fought the War of Independence against an alliance involving these two as belligerents. In the postwar period, Atatürk stressed that these countries were not their enemies any longer, also noting the new state’s desire to be part of the Western world. Because he believed that the Versailles order would collapse someday, Atatürk held that Turkey should align with countries like Britain and France, which favored the status quo, instead of revisionist actors like Germany and Italy when the collapse process starts. This was exactly what Turkish foreign policy makers did during World War II. Turkey abided by its primary foreign policy goals before and during the war, and for this reason, it signed a trilateral alliance deal with France and Britain.

Turkey’s preferences in the postwar period were also influenced by the emphases upon preservation of the status quo as well as Westernization. While Germany and Italy were the major threats to the status quo before World War II, the Soviet Union emerged as a big power in the aftermath of the war and expressed its ambitions over Turkish territories. In such a delicate environment, Turkey fulfilled its two foreign policy objectives by joining Western political and military alliances. For the first time, the US took its place within the framework of Turkey’s Westernization policy after the war.

Turkey’s Western orientation became more visible in the aftermath of World War II when the Soviet Union expressed its determination to have the status quo in Anatolia changed. Soviet discontent with the established regime in the Turkish Straits -- the Bosporus and the Dardanelles -- and with Turkey’s eastern border was perceived by Turkish policy makers as a threat that would potentially undermine the strength of the Turkish state and lead to the breakup of the territorial status quo.

In consideration of the threat posed by the Soviet Union, the Turkish foreign policy establishment sought to align with Western powers, the US being the leading one; despite initial reluctance, the US decided to serve as a balancing power against the Soviet Union. For the sake of preserving its territorial integrity and the geostrategic and geographic status quo, Turkey expressed eagerness to gain membership in NATO and other Western institutions, including the Council of Europe, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Western European Union (WEU). All these Westernization moves were aimed at securing the territorial integrity of Turkey.

The primary motive for Turkey’s eagerness to take part in Western institutions during this period was the Western orientation of Turkish foreign policy. The political administration did not hold great expectations about economic benefits from integration with the West; the probable economic gains to be incurred from membership in the EEC were not even considered. Likewise, the Council of Europe, set up to promote democratization and create a common European platform where regional problems and disputes might be settled, was not an organization that would appeal to Turkey because of its agenda and goals; what made the council attractive to Turkey was the fact that it was a Western institution.

Turkey’s strong interest in Western institutions was, therefore, driven by the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union and a growing fear of partition. The Turkish foreign policy establishment expressed its preference for Western institutions in order to address its security concerns and preserve the status quo in its geography. In this way, the two major foreign policy goals were reconciled; therefore, no tension or dilemma was experienced between these goals during the Cold War era. Turkey observed and honored both objectives by staying in Western political and military institutions.

Tension caused in 1990s by changes in Turkish foreign policy

Turkey’s policy of Westernization and particularly its relations with the European Community (EC) were shaped by rather technical issues up until the 1980s; likewise, its bilateral relations with the US were determined by its performance in acting its role within the famous American policy of containment; for this reason, no serious problems were ever experienced during this period of stability and smoothness. No threat of partition or violation of territorial integrity was perceived by Turkish foreign policy makers until the end of the Cold War period. However, problems have erupted since the 1980s mostly because the EC started turning into a political organization that put a strong emphasis on human rights and the recognition of minorities.

At this point, Turkish foreign policy makers faced a great dilemma between participating in Western institutions and securing Turkey’s territorial integrity via preserving the status quo. They were particularly ambivalent because Turkish foreign policy’s Western orientation, for the first time, proved to be inadequate to sustain the territorial integrity of the country. In other words, the two basic goals and targets of Turkish foreign policy, Westernization and preservation of the status quo, were no longer reconcilable, and they did not overlap. Turkey’s role as an important actor in the perpetuation of the policy of containment was over, and this created a new environment where Turkish-American relations had to be reshaped. For the European Union, Turkey’s role as a strategic and military power was no longer very important. The EU’s interest in Turkey was now driven by its ability to serve as political leverage to enable a great transformation in this country. All these facts were now telling Turkey that it could not rely on its indispensable role within the Western alliance as an asset that would ensure the protection of its territorial integrity.

While bilateral relations between Turkey and the US were smooth during the Clinton presidency, the Bush era was troublesome for both the EU and Turkey. Serious disagreements were observed between the EU and the US during this period where transatlantic relations were seriously harmed. This also negatively affected Turkey’s Western orientation because the EU and the US were representing different values and promoting opposite foreign policy designs.

American foreign policy in the aftermath of the notorious Sept. 11 incidents, designed by neoconservatives who relied on a unilateral style suggesting the use of coercion in the settlement of disputes, put Turkey in a delicate position in which it had to make a choice with respect to its Westernization policy. At this point, the EU and the US did not play roles that complemented each other; for this reason, US support for Turkey’s membership in the EU did not mean anything; besides, Turkey could not trust the US for its security and the preservation of the status quo any longer.

Obama presidency and elimination of Turkey’s ambivalence

In the event that Obama keeps his promises and really implements the foreign policy he has declared, multilateralism will replace Bush’s unilateral style, and cooperation in global platforms, including transatlantic relations, will become more visible. This will mean that the EU and the US will work together again to deal with global problems. Such cooperation will also address Turkey’s ambivalence and remove the tension in its foreign policy caused by the opposing tendencies of these two great powers. In the new era, Turkey will not have to make a choice between the EU, which promotes legality and human rights, and the US, which places greater emphasis on coercion. In short, the EU and the US will act together, and this will address the question of what party Turkey must talk to in addressing its problems.

During Obama’s term in office, preservation of the status quo -- protection of Turkey’s territorial integrity -- will be easier under the multilateral foreign policy design that he has pledged. Turkey, which has carried out its relations with the US in reliance on bilateral talks and contact, will have a greater opportunity in the new era to come up with lasting and rational solutions to its problems on multilateral platforms and initiatives, including the UN Security Council and NATO, where the US will also be a participant.

Dr. Cenap Çakmak is an instructor at Muğla University and a senior researcher at the Wise Men Center for Strategic Research (BİLGESAM)

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