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[Arciv]

Azerbaijan Increasingly Caught Between Salafism and Iran

By Anar Valiyev

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan became a battleground for many religious groups, sects and radical organizations. Being a predominantly secular society, Azerbaijanis cautiously watched the appearance of new religious movements. Neighboring countries such as Iran, Turkey as well as the Arab Gulf countries consider Azerbaijan as a strategic arena to expand their influence, often through religion. As a result of the absence of a strict policy toward religious groups, Azerbaijan became a haven for various religious organizations that preach opposite and contradictory ideas. Moreover, representatives of various sects clash with each other over influence in the country. For the past couple of years, the struggle between Shiites supported by Iran and Salafis (mostly supported from the North Caucasus and the Arab world) has intensified.

Salafis Encroach on Azerbaijan's Shiites

Azerbaijan is a Muslim country where roughly 75% of the population is Shiite, with the remainder Sunnis. The decades of co-existence between the two branches of Islam in Azerbaijan created a fragile balance that neither mainstream Shiites nor Sunnis wish to break. Moreover, Soviet repression against all branches of Islam put the Shiites and Sunnis of Azerbaijan in similar predicaments, providing them with shared experiences. Meanwhile, after centuries of development, Islam in Azerbaijan became a culture and tradition rather than strictly a religion. Although most Azerbaijanis zealously call themselves Muslims, they hardly observe any pillars of Islam. Local people visit sacred places called pirs, along with graveyards of "saints," rather than mosques, where they give money and offer sacrifices. The official corrupted clergy do not discourage such behavior since it benefits them in various ways, including financially.

The appearance of Salafis in the country, however, broke this delicate balance. Salafis first started to preach against the pirs and saint worship, calling such practices acts counter to Islam. They do not recognize the official Shiite clergy and accuse them of conducting an Iranian policy. Moreover, they consider Shiites as heretics and call for purifying Islam in Azerbaijan. In many instances, Salafis employ violence in order to bring attention or to show their adherents the "right" path. Thus, for the last couple of years, Salafis have attacked pirs and destroyed them in several instances, angering the local population. However, despite the population's hostility, the number of Salafis is increasing every year. By unofficial accounts, the number of Salafis reached 25,000 by the end of 2006, while 15 years ago they were non-existent in the country (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 2006; RFE/RL, August 10).

The northern region of Azerbaijan remains one of the areas where the Salafi movement has found promising ground. The media has reported several times on the existence of a Salafi extremist organization called the "Forest Brothers." The organization was involved in distributing religious literature, attacks on law enforcement officials and the murder of several policemen in Gusar region of Azerbaijan and in the capital (Day.az, March 29). Occasionally, law enforcement agencies report on attacks on police by "Wahabbis" who refuse to comply with Azerbaijani laws. On September 26, for example, two police officers were wounded by a member of a Salafi organization. Authorities immediately started another crackdown on Salafi cells in the region. Anti-terrorist groups arrived in the region from Baku and began intensive searches for suspects. A number of people belonging to Salafi cells were subsequently detained and arrested (Turan News Agency, September 27).

At the same time, every month police and Ministry of National Security officials conduct searches in the homes of Salafis for forbidden literature and illegal weapons. In April 2007, for example, 16 Salafis were arrested for illegal propaganda (Day.az, April 18). Many Azerbaijani Salafis sympathize with the Chechen cause and some have even been involved in military actions there (Terrorism Monitor, July 1, 2005). The first Salafi missionaries arrived in Azerbaijan from the North Caucasus in the mid-1990s, with the majority coming from Chechnya and Dagestan where Salafism had influence (Terrorism Monitor, July 1, 2005).

In Azerbaijan, there are diverging views among the public whether Salafism is a threat to the country. While law enforcement agencies repeatedly warn of the Salafi danger, other government agencies do not consider it much of a threat. Hidayat Orujev, the head of the State Committee for Working with Religious Organizations (SCWRO), believes that "there are few Wahabbi cells in the country, and they do not represent danger" (Day.az, September 27). Indeed, most of the time law enforcement agencies as well as the media inflate the danger posed by Salafis, often sensationalizing and hyping crimes where Salafism may have played a role.

It is also important to mention that the police respond intolerantly to adherents of Salafism. In the Zagatal region of Azerbaijan (a hotbed of the Salafi movement in Azerbaijan), for example, police allegedly burned and shaved the beards of Salafis. Many Salafis are brutally beaten and humiliated, and forced to come for "beard" check-ups to the police department every day (Turan News Agency, September 11). It appears that these harsh practices help to incite Salafis to undertake attacks against security services.

Overall, the government is playing a dangerous game with Salafis in Azerbaijan. The government does not, for instance, forbid Salafi preaching or close Salafi mosques. They do, however, prevent Salafism from expanding unchecked. Many analysts believe that the government artificially inflates the Salafi threat to distract the population away from its own inadequacies, and in fact employs Salafi adherents to irritate Iran and help curb Iranian influence in Azerbaijan.

Iran Monitoring Salafi Expansion in Azerbaijan

Salafi expansion in Azerbaijan is being closely monitored by Iran. The Iranian government and clergy are actively seeking ways to expand its influence over Azerbaijan and halt further Salafi incursions. Besides humanitarian assistance in refugee camps, exporting religious literature and TV broadcasting, Iranian authorities create and support radical organizations in the country. A branch of the Hezbollah organization that was closely related to the Iranian special services was active in Azerbaijan in the second half of the 1990s [1]. This branch was accused by the government of assassinating the famous academician Ziya Bunyadov in 1997 and was neutralized after unprecedented pressure by the authorities.

The failure of Hezbollah, however, did not stop other pro-Iranian terrorist organizations from emerging. In January 2007, Azerbaijani authorities announced the arrests of a group of 17 people headed by Said Dadashbeyli. The radical organization, called the Northern Army of the Mahdi, was formed with a purpose to fight against the United States and Israel, and to create a separate Sharia-ruled country. Allegedly, the heads of the organization kept secret contacts with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp. Thus, one of the leaders of the organization met with a member of the Corp in Iran's Qom city where he was allegedly offered financial support. Meanwhile, the members of the Northern Army of the Mahdi received military training in Iran (Turan News Agency, January 15). The group has also been accused of racketeering, armed assault, treason, drug dealing and a coup attempt. Some newspapers pointed out that U.S. intelligence agencies actively participated in neutralizing this radical organization (Yeni Musavat, January 29). According to these reports, the U.S. government is concerned that the Iranian special services are expanding their influence in Azerbaijan, possibly in order to gain leverage over the United States should Washington attempt to attack Iran.

A further sign demonstrating Iran's influence in Azerbaijan is an incident that occurred in mid 2006. Journalist Rafig Tagi published an article in Senet newspaper titled "Europe and Us." The article claimed that Islam did not bring any positive developments to "progress," and his argument divided Azerbaijani society. Immediately after publication, Iran-supported rallies and protests were organized in some Shiite-dominated villages of Azerbaijan. During the rallies, protesters called for the murder of Tagi. Meanwhile, Grand Ayatollah Fazel Lankarani of Iran issued a fatwa calling for the deaths of Rafig Tagi and Samir Sadaqatoglu, the editor of the newspaper. Authorities jailed the journalists, fearing possible assassinations and a spark of terrorism by Iranian-supported organizations. This case was used by Iranian authorities and the clergy to show their influence over the religious situation in Azerbaijan and the ability to affect government policy.

Conclusion

At the present stage, radical Shiite and Sunni groups do not pose a serious threat to Azerbaijan. The tradition of secularism in the country is strong. Nevertheless, the situation could change. Azerbaijani government agencies do not have a unified approach to handling religious organizations in the country. Meanwhile, there is a hidden competition between the state committee and the official clergy for control and registration of religious organizations.

At the same time, police use brutal force in dealing with many radical organizations, rejecting the process of negotiation. Unfortunately, none of these agencies look at the social aspects that cause people to join radical organizations. Identity crises, dissatisfaction with the current regime, existence of an ideological vacuum and poverty are the main reasons that bring youth to radical organizations in Azerbaijan. As time passes, it is believed that more and more young people will join potentially violent groups in the country. If this trend continues, sectarian violence could break out and lead to more instances of terrorism in Azerbaijan.

[Гость]

The Rise of Salafi Islam in Azerbaijan

After the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of an ideological vacuum, Azeri society began to embrace religion and observe long forgotten Islamic traditions. Thousands of missionaries from Arab countries, Iran and Russia converged on the republic to help “estranged” Muslims better understand their religion. Salafis, adherents of the ultra-orthodox branch of Islam, were among them. Many articles and news reports have been published about the activities of the Salafis in Azerbaijan, but most of them tend to be biased and superficial. Journalists, the government, and the official Shi’a clergy have all helped to create a negative public opinion on Salafis and tend to present them as either terrorists, heretics or both. Many Azeris often refer to Salafis in a derogatory way, dismissing them as Wahhabis, sakkalilar (bearded people) or garasakkalilar (black-bearded people). This carefully planned smearing campaign notwithstanding, the numbers and influence of Salafis is in fact steadily growing in Azerbaijan. Salafi ideas are becoming increasingly popular among the younger generations of Azerbaijan in particular. In Baku alone, which is the ultra-secular capital of Azerbaijan, the number of Salafis has reportedly reached 15,000. [1]

The first Salafi missionaries arrived in Azerbaijan from the northern Caucasus in the mid-1990s. The majority of them came from Chechnya and Dagestan where the Salafis had some influence, in large measure due to the Russian-Chechen wars. For a short while, Salafis made some inroads in Chechnya and were even able to create their own self-ruled area in the Dagestani villages of Karamaxi and Chobanmakhi. However, Salafis did not stop in Chechnya and Dagestan but extended their activities into Azerbaijan. Initially, they did not gain wide support among Azeris, as nationalism and pan-Turkism were much more popular than Islam. Moreover, in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the USSR, Azeri society was not as deeply impoverished and divided as today. In addition, 65-70% of Azeris are adherents of Shi’a Islam, and hence have little regard for Salafi ideas. The Shi’a Muslims of Azerbaijan – for both historical and cultural reasons – are heavily influenced by Iran, a country whose government is widely regarded as the archrival of Salafis. Given Azerbaijan’s Shi’a complexion, the religious Sunnis of rural northern Azerbaijan form the primary constituency of Salafism in the country.

The second wave of Salafi expansion started in 1999, with the beginning of the Second Russo-Chechen war. The Russian military command tried to push Chechen rebels – particularly those of a Salafi orientation – out of the northern Caucasus into neighboring Georgia and Azerbaijan. Thus, some of the 8,000 Chechen refugees that arrived in Azerbaijan in 1999-2000 were persecuted Chechen Salafis.

Meanwhile, missionaries from the Persian Gulf countries dramatically increased their activities in Azerbaijan. By 2003, 65 new Salafi-controlled mosques had been established in Azerbaijan. One of the largest Salafi mosques in the country is the Abu Bakr mosque. Built in 1997 in Baku by the Azeri branch of the Kuwaiti society Revival of Islamic Heritage, Abu Bakr became one of the most successful mosques in Azerbaijan. While on average the Shi’a or Sunni mosques are able to attract approximately 300 people for Friday prayers, the number of people visiting the Abu Bakr mosque typically reaches 5,000 to 7,000 people. [2] The Imam of the Abu Bakr mosque is Gammet Suleymanov, a graduate of the World Islamic University of Medina that is a leading center for the study and export of Salafism.

There are essentially three factors that are driving the expansion of Salafism in Azerbaijan. Firstly, the overwhelming majority of indigenous Salafis are Sunnis and from the ethnic minorities. This constituency sees Salafism as a counter-balance to growing Iranian influence in Azerbaijan. Secondly, the rapid polarization and impoverishment of Azeri society has led to a pervasive disillusionment with traditional institutions and modern Western democratic ideas. Salafis have cleverly tapped into this pool of profound discontent; frequently criticizing the corruption of the government, the decline of morality and traditions, as well as the rise of criminality in the country. [3] Thirdly, Salafis tout the universalistic qualities of their ideology, and the fact that it supposedly transcends all Islamic sects and traditions. This is particularly appealing in Azerbaijan where sectarian rivalry between Shi’as and Sunnis has been on the rise.

Not surprisingly the government of Azerbaijan does not condone either Salafism or its adherents. In the mid-1990s, the Azeri government tolerated Salafis, fearing that intolerance would irritate the rich clergy of the Persian Gulf states. From 2001 to 2003, however, the situation changed dramatically as the Azeri government started to persecute the Salafis. One of the main reasons for this policy shift was the rapidly increasing number of Salafi mosques. Another reason was the Salafi community’s preference for electing their emirs themselves rather than allowing the government to appoint them. But arguably the most important reason is the Salafis’ serious opposition to the current autocratic Azeri regime. In their preaching, Salafis blame the government for a number of failures, ranging from the defeat in the Karabakh conflict with Armenia to the moral decay of society. Alarmingly for the Azeri establishment, Salafis do not make a secret of their aspirations to acquire political power in Azerbaijan. [4]

Salafis attracted the attention of Azeri law-enforcement bodies and security agencies from the moment they appeared on the scene. In early spring of 2001, the Court on Heavy Crimes sentenced 12 Azeris who aspired to fight in Chechnya. During the trial, the emir of the Abu Bakr mosque, Suleymanov, was summoned to the court to give testimony on the case. All the would-be mujahideen had been frequent visitors of the Abu Bakr mosque and were recruited there by Chechen rebels. Another trial concerning the Pan-Islamic Hizb-ut Tahrir organization also revealed that its members had visited the Abu Bakr mosque. In May 2002, the deputy minister of national security, Tofiq Babayev, stated that a number of Arab countries were interested in spreading radical Wahhabism in Azerbaijan. According to Babayev, over 300 Azeris had been trained in Wahhabi centers in Dagestan. The deputy minister identified three stages in the effort to make Wahhabism a grassroots movement in Azerbaijan. First there is the spread of Wahhabi literature and the provision of financial assistance to potential activists. The second stage involves the efficient training of the activists, and the final stage deals with the mobilization of active members for acts of terrorism designed to destabilize the state. [5]

By the end of 2001, Azeri authorities launched an unofficial campaign against the Salafis. Taking into consideration that large groups of Salafis are Chechens, the authorities tried to create unfavorable conditions for Chechen refugees. As a result, Aslan Maskhadov, the slain leader of the Chechen resistance advised Chechens to leave Azerbaijan. Simultaneously, the authorities started a ruthless campaign against the Azeri Salafis. For a short while, many mosques were shut down and regional police forces were instructed to crush Salafi cells by any means necessary.

Salafism in Azerbaijan poses several serious challenges to the Azeri establishment and potentially to the United States. The proliferation of Salafi ideas among religious and ethnic minorities could create powerful centrifugal forces that will in due course threaten the national unity of Azerbaijan. Contrary to their own propaganda, the Salafis are exacerbating sectarian tensions in the country. They have already destroyed several Shi’a worshiping places, thus creating ill-feeling, which might in turn be directed at the minority Sunni community. In the very worst case scenario, serious violence directed toward the majority Shia community may provoke some form of Iranian intervention, not least because the Iranians are anxious to curtail Salafi influence in Azerbaijan. But more alarmingly perhaps, the Salafis’ skilful exposure and manipulation of the establishment’s incompetence, coupled with the increasing impoverishment of the country, may make them a powerful political force in the mid term. This will inevitably lead to a harsh security crackdown, which might in turn provoke serious acts of terrorism in the country. Aside from destabilizing the government, the risks to the United States, which has made considerable diplomatic, economic and security investments in Azerbaijan, are self-evident.

The only effective measures the government can undertake is to gradually diminish the influence of Salafi ideology through tight control over foreign missionary work; implementation of social and political reforms and initiation of Salafi-Sunni-Shi’a dialogue to reduce sectarian tensions in society. Otherwise, Azerbaijan may soon be faced with the threat of Islamic terrorism.

http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/ar...ticleid=2369735

[Гость]

Al-Qaeda in Azerbaijan: Myths and Realities

After the events of September 11 and the subsequent war on terrorism, Azerbaijan became one of the active members of the anti-terrorism coalition. Besides providing a small contingent of troops for peace operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Azerbaijani government actively cooperates with the United States and other members of the coalition to fight against al-Qaeda. For a short period of time following the September 11 attacks, Azerbaijani special services arrested 23 international terrorists and extradited them to Middle Eastern countries (Arif Yunusov, Islam in Azerbaijan, 2004). Late President Heydar Aliyev claimed that state security agents had arrested "big figures" from the al-Qaeda network. Supposedly, Aliyev was speaking about two members of Egyptian Islamic Jihad who were apprehended in Azerbaijan in 2002 with the assistance of the CIA. They were handed over to Egypt. Later in 2004, both local and foreign newspapers reported that al-Qaeda might implement large-scale attacks against some countries, including Azerbaijan, that have handed al-Qaeda members to the Egyptian government.

In most of the cases, the majority of arrested terrorists and radicals were foreign citizens, usually from Arab countries, in addition to Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan. For the last couple of years, however, ethnic Azerbaijanis have become involved in the activities of radical terrorist organizations. In March 2005, for example, an Azerbaijani court imprisoned a group of six people. The gang, headed by Amiraslan Iskenderov, who allegedly fought in Afghanistan from 1999-2003, was planning terrorist attacks against public and governmental buildings, strategic facilities and residences of foreign citizens. The terrorist group also planned to implement mass-scale chemical attacks in some regions of Azerbaijan. The group prepared a statement on behalf of al-Qaeda in the Caucasus, threatening the Azerbaijani government to carry out bombings in Baku. According to the Ministry of National Security, the terrorists' main aim was to force the Azerbaijani government to change its secular and democratic regime, as well as to quit the anti-terrorism coalition (Day.az, March 17, 2005). In June 2005, another group consisting of foreign and local citizens was indicted. The group received special instructions from the Abu Hafs, the coordinator of al-Qaeda in the Caucasus, and was planning to commit terrorist acts, bombings and arson to cause political instability (Today.az, July 6, 2005).

Later in March 2006, Eldar Mahmudov, the Azerbaijani minister of national security, warned the public on activities of religious-extremist groups in the country. Mahmudov claimed that before September 11, Azerbaijan was only a transit country for terrorists. After becoming a member of the anti-terrorism coalition, however, terrorists began to target Azerbaijan as well (Echo Newspaper, March 18).

Independent analysis would doubt the existence or even the interest of al-Qaeda in Azerbaijan. After September 11, it became fashionable among some autocratic regimes in Central Asia to "neutralize" al-Qaeda cells in their respective countries and to show their importance to the anti-terrorism coalition. Azerbaijan was no exception. Officials, special services and the media actively circulate a variety of myths, stressing the importance of Azerbaijan as well as the potential danger from al-Qaeda. Some of these myths are below.

Myth I: Al-Qaeda is planning attacks on Azerbaijan for its participation in the international anti-terrorism coalition.

One of the most circulated myths that can be found in the local Azerbaijani media implies al-Qaeda's plans to launch attacks in Azerbaijan as a punishment for participating in the anti-terrorism coalition and to force the Azerbaijani government to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite the fact that Azerbaijan was one of the first countries that answered the call of U.S. President George W. Bush to wage a war against terrorism, it is unlikely that al-Qaeda would target Azerbaijan. As previous actions of al-Qaeda and its affiliated organizations have shown, the leaders of these groups are rational actors who do not generally attack merely for the sake of terrorism. Al-Qaeda prefers to attack cities where a terrorism strike would lead to both high casualties as well as a huge resonance. Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, is not of great global importance. Attacking Baku would offer little benefit to al-Qaeda.

Secondly, Azerbaijan does not offer many attractive targets. The only possible targets might be the U.S., British or the Israeli embassies, or the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. After September 11, there were several reports claiming al-Qaeda was planning to attack the U.S. Embassy in Baku. Those reports, however, were not independently confirmed.

Myth II: Al-Qaeda might attack the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline and disrupt oil supplies to the West.

In 2004, the Azerbaijani government stated that the country's special services had obtained information that members of al-Qaeda were planning acts of sabotage designed to derail the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline—a $3 billion project intended to transport oil from the Caspian Sea region to the world markets. The news caught the eye of many security experts and government officials. In the wake of the Limburg bombing—the French-flagged oil tanker—and al-Qaeda's adoption of the new tactic to disrupt oil supplies from the Middle East to the West, government officials called for tighter security measures for the pipeline. Thorough analysis, however, can explain that al-Qaeda is not very interested in the destruction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline

First of all, the pipeline transports approximately one million barrels per day, supplying only 1.2 percent of all world oil consumption. A disruption of the pipeline can hardly hit global oil supplies. Second, the pipeline and its infrastructure can be easily reconstructed within weeks or even days. Third, an attack on oil installations in the Middle East region, especially in the Gulf countries, which give al-Qaeda more attention than the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which has more regional and less global significance. It is worth mentioning, however, that disruption of the pipeline would lead to anxiety or even panic in the world market and affect prices. The attack on the pipeline would show that al-Qaeda is targeting, and capable of attacking, oil facilities outside the Middle East. Meanwhile, a terrorist attack on a pipeline could become a mini-catastrophe for the country. Azerbaijan could lose its attractiveness to investors due to elevated financial risks.

Myth III: Al-Qaeda recruits Azerbaijanis for terrorist attacks.

In March 2006, Minister of National Security Mahmudov shocked the public with the information that an al-Qaeda Caucasus terrorist cell was planning to recruit Azerbaijani women for suicide missions. The minister maintained that although the country has extensive experience with fighting extremism, the information "was the worst discovery for us over the past years" (Echo Newspaper, March 18).

The real situation in Azerbaijan, however, is different. Despite the fact that Azerbaijan is a Muslim country, a majority of the population consider themselves secular. It should be mentioned that while most Azerbaijanis consider Islam part of their national identity, any mixing of religion with the political sphere is discouraged by a vast majority. Critical to understanding this issue is the fact that the Azerbaijani view of Islam is one of a common national characteristic, inseparable from its Azerbaijani ethnic identity, which no single group can monopolize. Compared to other Muslim countries such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, al-Qaeda will have a hard time influencing and recruiting local Azerbaijanis for suicide terrorist missions. Furthermore, up to 75-80 percent of the population is Shiite, to which the ideology of al-Qaeda is hostile. Finally, a majority of the mosques, where al-Qaeda usually recruits its followers, are under tight surveillance by the Azerbaijani government.

The Reality

It cannot be denied, however, that members of other radical organizations are active in Azerbaijan. During the last couple of years, members of terrorist organizations such as the Caucasian Islamic Army, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Jeyshullah, Hizb ut-Tahrir and Jamaat al-Muvahidun have been neutralized.

On April 18, a group of Azerbaijani citizens calling itself Jamaat al-Muvahidun were sentenced to terms in prison. According to the Ministry of National Security, the group planned to bomb the U.S., Israeli and Russian embassies. In addition, they were planning the assassination of members of governmental and law-enforcement bodies for cooperation in the anti-terrorism coalition. The group was also planning to blow up buildings of State Oil Company, National Bank and other strategic facilities. It was revealed that the young people were ready to get military training in the camps of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey in order to fight "infidel countries" (Turan News Agency, April 18). On April 19, the Azerbaijani court sentenced an international group consisting of 16 people to terms in prison. The group, mostly comprised of citizens of Azerbaijan—although there were citizens of Russia, Turkey and Yemen among them—were supposedly members of al-Qaeda, trained in the Pankisi gorge in Georgia (Terrorism Focus, April 25). The gang members were accused of terrorism, illegally obtaining arms and murdering a police officer in Baku in July 2005. Group members, meanwhile, were recruiting young Azerbaijanis to fight in Chechnya against Russian troops. For the last year, over 100 people were sentenced to various jail terms for the participation in the war in Chechnya—or for preparing to do so (Turan News Agency, April 19).

Recent trends show that local radical organizations pose more of a danger to Azerbaijan than does al-Qaeda. Yet, the Azerbaijani government is trying to connect the surge of local radicalism with the influence of al-Qaeda. There are several reasons for that. First, the country's regime is trying to show the United States its loyalty concerning the war on terrorism. Thus, the sentencing of al-Qaeda "members" was done in order to demonstrate the activity of Azerbaijan's special services. Secondly, by exaggerating the danger from al-Qaeda, the Azerbaijani government is trying to portray itself as the one and only pro-democratic force in a region dominated by anti-Western religious extremists. For many years, the current regime in Azerbaijan successfully sold this propaganda, often depicting outbreaks of social unrest as the work of Islamic extremists.

The most important aspect, however, is that the government of Azerbaijan, as well as in many countries in the Middle East, falsely interpret the issue of religious extremism. They believe that terrorist attacks occurring in their countries as well as the establishment of cells of radical Islamic organizations are attributable to some "nerve" center headed by bin Laden's al-Qaeda. It is easier for the Azerbaijani government to connect jihadi phenomena in the country with al-Qaeda rather than to look at the real factors leading to the emergence of such organizations. The core of these radical extremist organizations is usually a low income group of religious young men, who are mostly unemployed and dissatisfied with the autocratic regime of their country. They tend to see a theocratic state as the only alternative for a highly corrupt and debauched government. One might conclude that the government's preoccupation with al-Qaeda targeting Azerbaijan is a deliberate attempt to divert popular attention from daily problems by creating a substitute enemy.

Historical experience shows that cracking down radical cells in the country will hardly bring long-term benefits. Instead, it could further alienate religious minority groups and lead them into the trap of jihadi organizations. For the Azerbaijani government, it is time to address important issues such as corruption, poverty and democratic development. Otherwise the country will be bogged down in eternal conflict with the growing influence of radical organizations.