Is Armenia really ready to sign Karabakh peace principles?
The blueprint for peace in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh is nothing new. The so-called Madrid Principles (or Basic Principles) have been under discussion since 2006, in one form or another. The problem has been securing acceptance of the principles; something which may, at last, be coming true.
Although Azerbaijan deemed the Principles “largely acceptable” as long ago as 2010, Armenia has blown hot and cold on whether it is willing to support them. Last November Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian rejected a new plan floated by Azerbaijan and insisted that a solution must be based on the Basic Principles, but Nalbandian’s statement also contradicted a September 2011 statement by Azerbaijan that Armenia had, in fact, rejected the Principles. There was also never any real evidence that Baku had moved away from its acceptance of the existing blueprint.
So there is a degree of contradiction and confusion surrounding attitudes towards the Basic Principles. But it was undoubtedly significant when Nalbandian said recently, in a statement which attracted relatively little attention, that Armenia is “ready to sign six basic principles on the settlement of the conflict”. Yerevan’s acceptance, he said, is conditional on Azerbaijan being persuaded to accept them by the OSCE Minsk Group, co-chaired by Russia, the US and France and tasked with mediating the peace process. Since Azerbaijan has never really opposed the peace blueprint, this condition looks like it’s already been met.
So what are these ‘six principles’ which Nalbandian, meeting with French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius on 14 May, has supposedly agreed to sign? Although the full package of principles supposedly contains a large number of modalities, secondary points and amendments, the six core principles are:
-return of the occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh [i.e. the regions of Aghdam, Fuzuli, Jabrayil, Zangilan, Gubadli, Kalbajar and Lachin] to Azerbaijani control;
-interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-governance;
-a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh [the ‘Lachin corridor’];
-future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will;
-the right of all internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to return to their former places of residence; and
-international security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation.
The most contentious of these points for Armenia’s politicians has been the first. The idea of full withdrawal of Armenian military units from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan has traditionally been seen as a betrayal of Nagorno-Karabakh. There is also the issue of Armenians, which Yerevan has settled in the occupied regions, previously populated entirely by ethnic Azerbaijanis, over the past twenty years.
Even when Armenia has acknowledged the need to withdraw in principle, the details have been problematic. Azerbaijan tended to push for an immediate and full withdrawal, whilst Armenia has preferred the idea of a gradual, phased withdrawal. Baku has subsequently accepted the prospect of a phased withdrawal, probably on the basis that getting the process started was the most important point.
Armenia has also pushed for a stronger security guarantee and a firm date for a referendum on Nagorno-Karabakh’s final status, which Azerbaijan has resisted. One outstanding problem from Azerbaijan’s side is the existence of the Lachin Corridor, which Baku sees as maintaining the symbiotic relationship between Yerevan and the self-declared Nagorno-Karabakh authorities. But all other things being equal Azerbaijan can probably accept the temporary existence of a corridor and address the issue down the line, if it means moving the process forward. As for the return of IDPs, Azerbaijan not only insists on the return of Azerbaijani IDPs to the regions around Nagorno-Karabakh. Baku also demands the right of return for the Azerbaijani community of Nagorno-Karabakh proper (primarily from the town of Shusha), before any referendum on the region’s final legal status can be held.
So with all these caveats and undecided issues taken into account, what has prompted Armenia’s apparent change in policy – and will it actually happen? It may be that the presidential election in February, which returned President Serzh Sargsyan to power, has created the political breathing space necessary to make progress on the Karabakh conflict. But political opposition to concessions on Nagorno-Karabakh are not just manifested through the ballot box, so much as through street protests and criticism from elite groups. It would need enormous reserves of political capital to try and push this through, which Sargsyan doesn’t really possess.
Of course, it may be that Sargsyan has decided that taking a bold step and fulfilling the Basic Principles is simply the right thing to do. But he has shown no previous sign of doing so and there has been no structural political or economic shift likely to have changed his mind.
This raises questions about the viability of the Basic Principles actually getting signed: the factors behind Armenian opposition are still in place. Perhaps Nalbandian’s statement was taken out of context, or perhaps his conception of the Principles – on such issues as the timeline for withdrawal, the existence of the Lachin Corridor, or the modalities of the final referendum for Nagorno-Karabakh – is not, in fact, the same as Baku’s. Perhaps it was a bluff, based on a perception that Baku would not actually agree.
The point is that misinformation and confusion over what’s under discussion has dominated the peace process for years. Nalbandian’s statement could be genuine; it could be taken out of context; or it could be referring to a conception of the Basic Principles which Azerbaijan does not share. Until there is more clarity on what the points of agreement and disagreement actually are, it will be hard to disentangle the truth.
щас там вбакЫ анорексия разума случится :laugh: