Американо-турецкие отношения

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Вахид Эрдем: Военное присутствие США в Черноморском регионе может вызвать напряженность

Желание США к военному присутствию в Черноморском регионе, в котором существуют "замороженные конфликты", может привести к напряженности, заявил глава делегации Турции в Парламентской Ассамблее НАТО, вице-президент ПА НАТО Вахид Эрдем, отвечая на обвинения со стороны американских политиков в том, что Турция препятствует закреплению военного присутствия США в Черноморском регионе и сотрудничает с Россией.

Как сообщает агентство АТ, в этой связи Эрдем также заявил, обращаясь к представителям США, что "если вы действительно хотите решать проблемы, то приложите усилия для урегулирования нагорно-карабахского конфликта - в Азербайджане, и югоосетинского и абхазского конфликтов в Грузии. Окажите содействие устранению напряженности на Кавказе". При этом, он добавил, что "пока не будут решены данные проблемы, не следует допускать процессов, порождающих другие вопросы". Отметим, что делегация Турции прибыла в Вашингтон с недельным визитом с целью участия в заседании Комитета обороны и безопасности НАТО.

http://www.regnum.ru/news/district-abroad/...nia/780428.html

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CFR report generating momentum for a new era in US-Turkey relations

Monday, February 12, 2007

ELİF ÖZMENEK

NEW YORK - Turkish Daily News

The Council on Foreign Relations' (CFR), one of the most influential think tanks cautioned that “time is growing short” to take steps toward improving U.S.-Turkey relations. In its recently released report titled, “Generating Momentum for a New Era in U.S.-Turkey Relations,” the authors claim that during the next two years, "both countries will face a series of tough foreign policy questions concerning Iraq, Iran, the Middle East and Cyprus just as politicians in both capitals are entering election cycles.”

CFR experts believe that the Turks have reason to be concerned. “The reality of the situation in Iraq strongly suggests that the Kurds are poised to gain at least significant autonomy in Iraq and control of the oil-rich region surrounding the city of Kirkuk.” Further, it would be illogical for U.S. forces, the report stated, to take any action that might destabilize the only region of Iraq that has been relatively quiet.

The report recommended a two-track diplomatic approach that will simultaneously help to manage current policy differences and lay the groundwork for future cooperation on a broader agenda between Ankara and Washington.

The first track should entail the pursuit of several short-term and time-sensitive initiatives to address current issues that present obstacles to progress in relations. Within this first track, the report says, the Kurdish issue should be a priority. The initial agenda for the process should have three steps, stated the report:

1 – Clarifying the positions of all parties on the future status of northern Iraq;

2 – Identifying areas of common interest and potential confidence-building measures (such as Turkish investment in infrastructure development, free trade, oil pipelines, and adequate border controls);

3 – Possible avenues for dealing with the PKK in northern Iraq (such as pressure from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, PUK, and the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party, KDP, to restrain the PKK, a Turkish amnesty for PKK fighters, rules governing extradition, and potential combined military action.)

The Cyprus issue should be another priority within this first track, claimed CFR experts. “Given German Chancellor Angela Merkel's more forthcoming position toward Turkish membership in the European Union, there is an opportunity for Washington to work closely with Berlin on Turkey's accession process.”

While the U.S. government keeps promoting Turkey's EU accession, the Cyprus issue has to be resolved. “Renewed leadership to end the island's divided status is also required, and the U.S. government is well positioned to provide it.” The United States should appoint a new special Cyprus coordinator, urge EU leaders “to use their collective clout to require more constructive behavior from the Cypriot government,” and take concrete political, diplomatic, and economic steps to break Turkish Cypriots from their international isolation, the report suggests.

The second track includes longer-term efforts to create mechanisms for cooperation:

The United States should establish a high-level U.S.-Turkish Cooperation Commission that would include a “strategic security dialogue,” the “expansion of economic and commercial ties,” and the “development of cultural exchanges, with emphasis on the expansion of educational opportunities.”

Some say that following Gül's visit, the U.S. administration will definitely be against the introduction of the Armenian genocide bill in Congress. Measures against the PKK will be increased. Turkish sensitivities over Kirkuk are both understood and shared. However, the main question remains: Will any of these concerns translate into action? At the end of the day, as the CFR experts said, time is running out to build new momentum in the U.S.-Turkey relationship.

here

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В Турции появляются мнения о возможном альянсе между Турцией и Ираном

Turkey should not have high hopes for intervention in Iraq

Monday, February 12, 2007

Simply, a belief to have a right is not enough. A legality of use of force has to be also successfully 'marketed' to the world. If not, any kind of use of force is considered primarily as a threat to international peace and security.

SYLVIA TIRYAKI

The hypothesis put forward by Ömer Taşpınar in the last issue of Newsweek International, that Turkey – if not left with any other choice – can “end up creating an unprecedented Sunni-Shiite axis of frustration against America” looks more like an episode from a scary science fiction movie than a prediction bordering reality.

On the other hand, there is this realistic justification for the assessment of the situation given by Taşpınar: Turkey and Iran having a common cause with the ability to unite even the major adversaries. The presence of the Kurdish militants' in northern Iraq seems to be capable of being such a drive.

Moreover, the outcome of last week's Ankara-Washington talks doesn't leave much space for optimism either.

The post Sept. 11 world:

Turkey's call for help with respect to its concerns over developments in northern Iraq hasn't been heard by U.S. officials as they didn't show any will to interfere with the plans to hold a referendum on the status of the oil-rich (and Kurdish-claimed) city of Kirkuk this year. Leaving the decision on whether to proceed with the referendum with the Iraqi Kurdish leadership is almost tantamount to giving it the green light.

However, the more the local Iraqi referendum being held in 2007 looks like a reality, the more Turkey taking the situation into its own hands looks like an option. Yet, even the highly hypothetical existence of such an option – realizable alone or together with a neighbor – suggests an unnerving scenario.

It is indeed unnerving despite the fact that a relaxed approach towards the use of force has become somewhat trendy in the post Sept. 11 era and military interventions are mushrooming, slowly turning the entire Middle East into one broader battlefield. The terrible humanitarian costs of these interventions speak for themselves.

An act of intervention has been defined by political science as a “coercive interference with the domestic affairs and a breach of sovereignty of another state” and as such “not necessarily lawful or unlawful.” In fact, the only real exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force by the U.N. Charter are the right to self-defense and U.N. Security Council authorization. Any other legal justification for the use of force, being it humanitarian intervention, “pro-democratic intervention,” response to terrorism or “self help” is rather doubtful.

‘Inherent rights'?:

Nevertheless, it is also true that in the wake of the new concept of terrorism there has been a shift in defining a threat to international peace and security while collective and individual self-defense (with high emphasis on anticipatory) have been given a broader interpretation. A practical exercise of this broader understanding could have been observed again as applied to the Middle East – with dire consequences.

It seems that if in Turkey the popular tendency to please nationalists wins over common sense, a pretext for the intervention or at least precedence for such an action can be found.

However, very fortunately there has never been a common position on the legality of intervention in the international community. Even in our “intervention-friendly” epoch the legality of forcible intrusion is not taken for granted and a majority of states are very reluctant to take on a custom that would dilute the exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force.

Simply, a belief to have a right is not enough. A legality of use of force has to be also successfully “marketed” to the world. If not, any kind of use of force is considered primarily as a threat to international peace and security. Heroes flirting with the idea to prove the “inherent right” of their nation “to defend itself” should keep in mind what the legal options of the international community under the U.N. Charter are in such cases.

Turkey should not have high hopes for intervention in Iraq

Monday, February 12, 2007

here

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Turkey seeks US support on Kurdish problem

Ankara expects more cooperation from Washington in dealing with militants on both sides of the Iraqi border, writes Mark Tran

Tuesday February 6, 2007

Guardian Unlimited

US and Iraqi soldiers guard a building damaged in a bomb blast in Kirkuk. Photograph: AP

It is a safe bet that the Kurdish question will receive an airing when the Turkish foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, meets the secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, in Washington today.

Mr Gul is likely to discuss with US officials renewed activity by Kurdish rebels using northern Iraq as a springboard for attacks on Turkish territory.

Turkey, a Nato member, has been dissatisfied with the level of cooperation in dealing with militants from the Kurdistan Workers party (PKK). It expects a current ceasefire to end in the spring and is bracing itself for further attacks.

Retired General Joseph Ralston, a former Nato supreme allied commander, has been coordinating US efforts for countering the PKK and the state department yesterday said Gen Ralston was working to decrease tensions on both sides of the border.

Such reassurances will cut no ice with Turkey as US troops in the region have done little to prevent cross-border raids.

But the PKK is only part of Turkey's worries. Ankara's nightmare is an independent Kurdish state bringing together some 15-20 million Kurds who live in a region that straddles Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria.

That scenario could move a step closer this year if Iraq goes ahead with a referendum in the northern city of Kirkuk. Article 140 in the Iraqi constitution called for a census and a referendum in oil-rich Kirkuk to reverse Saddam Hussein's "Arabisation" policy that drove out Kurds and replaced them with Arabs.

The referendum will determine whether Kirkuk will become part of Iraq's semi-autonomous Kurdish region. For the Kurds, the answer is a no-brainer as they want the oil-rich city of Kirkuk to become the capital of their region.

Because the Kirkuk referendum has all the makings of a flashpoint, the Iraqi Study Group recommended postponing such a vote. A postponement, however, risks inflaming Kurdish sentiment.

For the Kurds, such a move would be seen as the latest in a series of betrayals. In 1975, the former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger brokered the Algiers agreement that ended Iranian support for the Kurds, leaving them at the mercy of Saddam. Encouraged to rise up by the George Bush Snr in 1991, they were left again to face Saddam. Thousands fled to Turkey when the rebellion failed.

Various Kurdish leaders such as Massoud Barzani, the Kurdish president, have warned that the region would plunge into war should the referendum be postponed. Yet any move towards secession would increase the chances of Turkish military intervention, not only to prevent its own Kurdish population from seceding, but also to "protect" northern Iraq's Turkmen population, who are ethnic Turks.

Tension in Kirkuk is already rising, although it has been spared the bloodletting that has engulfed the rest of Iraq. At the weekend, two people were killed in car bombings in the city. Last month, a UN report voiced concerns at reports of mistreatment of ethnic Turkmen and Arabs by the Kurdish majority and warned that the deteriorating human rights situation in Kirkuk could be a prelude to a looming crisis in the Kurdish region.

Some analysts believe that the Kurdish issue could push Iran and Turkey closer together, hardly something Washington would welcome. Omer Taspinar, a fellow at the Washington thinktank the Brookings Institution, said the meetings between Turkish and US officials should put an end to the Bush administration's "happy talk" about the stability of Iraqi Kurdistan.

"This is an election year in Turkey," he wrote in Newsweek, "and prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has every incentive to demonstrate his nationalist credentials against political rivals, many favouring military intervention. All this will inevitably push Turkey toward Iran - and may even end up creating an unprecedented Sunni-Shia axis of frustration against America."

http://www.guardian.co.uk/turkey/story/0,,2007117,00.html

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Turkey, Iran set to increase energy ties

Thursday, February 22, 2007

Ankara and Tehran verbally agree to cooperate on oil and gas exploration and transfer of Turkmenistan's gas via the Iranian pipeline, a move that comes on the eve of latest UN deadline to impose tougher sanctions on Iran

FULYA ÖZERKAN

ANKARA - Turkish Daily News

Neighboring countries Turkey and Iran have verbally agreed to seal two separate deals in the sphere of energy, only a day before the U.N. deadline urging Tehran to freeze uranium enrichment or face broader sanctions expired.

The development came after talks between Turkey's Energy Minister Hilmi Güler and Iran's visiting Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki on the sidelines of the Turkish-Iranian joint economic commission meeting late on Tuesday.

One of the planned agreements provides the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) with the opportunity to explore oil and natural gas in Iran, an offer Tehran has rejected for more than a decade, while the second is about the transfer of Turkmen natural gas via Iranian territory, a move that is expected to concern Washington which is against bypassing the Caspian in terms of gas transfer.

Turkish and Iranian officials will hammer out the details on March 22 when Iran's Oil Minister Kazem Vaziri Hamaneh pays an official visit to Ankara. But Turkish Energy Ministry sources, speaking with the Turkish Daily News, sounded cautious, saying that it was a long process and that for the deals to be acted upon there is a need to set up committees made up of both Turkish and Iranian officials for further negotiations to discuss the details.

Mottaki turned his Ankara trip into an occasion to bolster ties with Turkey at every sphere. He met with President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül and Energy Minister Güler. The Iranian minister co-chaired the joint economic commission meeting between the two countries. Sources families with the joint economic commission meetings expressed surprise that Iran was represented at such a high level at the meeting. State Minister for Foreign Trade Kürşad Tüzmen represented the Turkish side.

After the joint commission meeting, Güler announced that Turkey and Iran were on the way of turning a new page on energy cooperation, according to Iranian News Agency (IRNA). The Turkish minister delivered positive messages, saying that Ankara and Tehran agreed to establish a joint natural gas-powered electricity generation plant on the Turkish-Iranian border.

Washington on watch:

U.S. diplomatic sources here played down concerns over the planned agreement between Ankara and Tehran, saying that the agreement has not yet been signed. But the sources said Washington was closely watching developments on the issue.

Iran faces tougher sanctions from the international community due to its insistence to push ahead with the disputed nuclear program. Tehran yesterday defied the latest U.N. deadline to suspend sensitive atomic activities, saying that his country's nuclear drive was vital for its future.

To the displeasure of the United States, the verbal agreement between Ankara and Tehran foresees the transfer of the Turkmen gas through the Iranian pipeline, which will help both the Turkmen and Iranian gas to be transferred to Turkey and finally to Europe.

The public announcement of the Turkish-Iranian willingness to cooperate on energy came just two weeks after Foreign Minister Gül's visit to the United States. Washington backs energy projects aimed at transferring Turkmen gas supplies through the Caspian.

More than a week ago, a U.S. delegation led by Matt Bryza, deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, and Daniel S. Sullivan, assistant secretary, had talks both in Istanbul and in the Turkish capital at the Turkish-U.S. Economic Partnership Commission.

The delegation made clear once more that the United States backs a pipeline project transferring natural gas through the Caspian Sea, instead of the Iranian pipeline, from which Turkey receives gas supplies. Ahead of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to energy-rich Turkmenistan last week, the U.S. delegation conveyed to the Energy Ministry the U.S. position on the transfer of energy.

Ankara takes risk in the name of trade:

The development raised concerns that Turkey was bypassing the Caspian in terms of gas transfer. But a senior Turkish Energy Ministry official, speaking to the TDN, dismissed such worries, saying that the verbal agreement in question did not amount to bypassing the Caspian.

The same official, who declined to be named, said, “It's all about trade, not a bypass plan.” He said Turkey was utilizing energy resources both from the Caspian and Iran.

The agreement to transfer gas via Iran also reawakened old fears over the agenda of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, which has Islamic roots. In 1996, then-Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan visited Iran shortly after taking office where he concluded a $23 billion natural gas deal with Tehran. The agreement drew criticism at the time from opposition groups over potential ideological motivations on the part of Erbakan's pro-Islamic Welfare Party (RP).

here

[Злодиюка]

Честно говоря не нашёл тему, в которой говорилось об обращении сотни бузнесменов америки к бушу с просьбой вопрепятствовать принятию резолюции по геноциду..

Поэтому выставлю официальный ответ представительства Microsoft тут

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Recently some news agencies ran a story stating that 100 of the United States’ leading entrepreneurs, including Bill Gates and Warren Buffett, sent a letter to President Bush calling on him to put pressure on Congress to not recognize the Armenian Genocide.

Concerning to this I am authorized to state:

“Bill Gates has not signed any such letter. Microsoft Corporation and its chairman, Bill Gates, were not aware that any such letter existed and cannot comment as to its contents, origin, purpose or signatories.”

Microsoft RA

Country Manager Grigor Barseghyan

Վերջերս որոշ լրատվամիջոցներ հայտարարեցին, թե իբրև 100 ամերիկյան խոշոր ձեռնարկատերեր , այդ թվում Բիլ Գեյթսն ու Ուարեն Բաֆֆեթը, նամակ են ուղղարկել ԱՄՆ Նախագահ Բուշին` կոչ անելով նրան, ճնշում գործադրել Կոնգրեսի վրա, որպեսզի չճանաչվի Հայկական Ցեղասպանությունը:

Այդ կապակցությամբ լիազորված եմ հայտարարել հետևյալը`

" Բիլ Գեյթսը չի ստորագրել ոչ մի նմանատիպ նամակ: Մայքրոսոֆթ ընկերությունն, ի դեմս ընկերության նախագահ Բիլ Գեյթսի, անգամ տեղյակ չի եղել նման նամակի գոյության մասին, և չի կարող մեկնաբանել դրա բովոնդակությունը, ծագումը, հետապնդած նպատակները կամ ստորգրողներին:"

ՄԱՅՔՐՈՍՈՖԹ ԱՐԷՅ

Տնօրեն` Գրիգոր Բարսեղյան

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Is the U.S.-Turkey Alliance at an End?

By Rajan Menon and S. Enders Wimbush

Special to washingtonpost.com's Think Tank Town

Tuesday, April 24, 2007; 12:00 AM

Turkey and the United States are approaching a critical strategic crossroad that will determine both the shape and the content of their relationship for the foreseeable future. The pressures forcing change on this long-standing alliance -- which has endured since the Truman Doctrine in 1947 -- are powerful. Neither Turkish nor American policymakers seem to grasp the emerging reality that this important friendship is fast eroding; alternatively, they have concluded that the alliance has run its course and are prepared to let it go. Neither side is taking serious remedial measures to recalibrate a vibrant friendship that has served both countries well for more than half a century. The consequences for both sides of a failure to make necessary course corrections will be significant.

The war in Iraq is the most immediate bone of contention driving Turkey and the U.S. apart, but it is not the only driver. Since Turkey denied use of its bases to initiate a second American front in Iraq in the run-up to the 2003 invasion, the prevailing perception across the Turkish political spectrum -- including in the all-important military and political elite -- is that Washington is seeking to punish Turkey. For its part, Washington has made its feeling of betrayal clear to the Turks and to the world. Political miscalculations, articulated via hyperbolic political theater on both sides, might have dissipated under different circumstances, but this has not happened.

Instead, the Iraq war has put new energy into the third rail of Turkish politics: the Kurdish question. Ankara fears not only that the American-led intervention cannot hold Iraq together, but that it is a powerful stimulant for its breakup, which will result in an independent Kurdish entity in northern Iraq, bordering Turkey's Kurdish population. Turkey's experience fighting Kurdish separatists and terrorists is long, bitter and bloody. Consequently, there is no resonance at any point on Turkey's political spectrum, or even in private discussions, for allowing something resembling a Kurdish state to emerge on the ruins of broken Iraq.

To the contrary, in the last few days, Turkey's military leaders acknowledged that they are seriously contemplating finally intervening with their own powerful military in northern Iraq to eliminate this possibility, regardless of the presence of American troops there or elsewhere in the country. Recent reports suggest that this decision is already before Turkey's parliament, and that it has strong popular support.

Anti-Americanism in Turkey, fueled by the continuing chaos in Iraq and the decisions that led to that imbroglio, is running at unprecedented levels, as opinion polls have graphically documented in recent months. Nearly 80 percent of Turks view the United States as a problem, including being a direct threat to Turkey's national security.

Iraq is the immediate irritant, but Turkey's search for a more comprehensive identity has been underway since at least the end of the Cold War. Turkey has been slowly redefining its strategic identity since the early 1980s, an evolution to which official Washington has been stunningly silent. Decades of Turkish secularism and an obsessive pro-Western orientation -- always somewhat artificial -- are being adjusted to reflect the realities of Turkey's new strategic position and objectives. Today many Turks understand that it is essential to create a more organic equilibrium in Turkey's relationships with the Muslim world, with Eurasia -- particularly with Russia and the emerging Eurasian power China -- and formalize Turkey's relationship with the West, emblemized by Turkey's current efforts to join the European Union. A new generation of Turkish strategists sees Turkey as a major player across the Islamic world and as a major Eurasian actor -- with or without the United States -- while still keeping a strong foothold in the West.

American policy makers continue to mouth platitudes to the effect that Turkey is a model democratic secular Islamic state, a misplaced accolade most Turks find highly insulting. They view themselves rather differently, and more broadly: as a crucial ally in the struggle against terrorism; as a critical security nexus atop an arc extending from Israel to Central Asia, a zone of actual or potential upheaval and war; as a guarantor of essential water-borne commerce, particularly hydrocarbons; as a frontline state against a potentially nuclear-armed Iran; and as a corridor for the strategically important Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline.

Turks have always assumed that their cooperation is key to a durable settlement in Iraq. Most are astonished and aggrieved that the American debate on how to fix the Iraq mess, and the policies of the George W. Bush administration in particular, fail to reflect either Turkey's frontline position or the consequences of American failure in Iraq on Turkey's immediate and longer-term security interests. America, they feel, has taken Turkey for granted. In this, the American media has been complicit, or ignorant. In most pundits' discussions of how the Iraq issue might eventually be settled, Turkey is almost never cited as a critical actor or as the likely recipient of the consequences of the action of others, almost as if Iraq might somehow be fixed without Turks ever noticing or caring.

The Iraq problem has accelerated a debate in Turkey that likely would have taken place anyway. Today, influential Turks, government officials and foreign policy experts alike have embarked on a strategic reassessment. Turkey's possible reorientation could include building deeper ties with new partners, among them Russia -- with whom Turkey is developing deep economic and energy ties; China, which is building a strong position throughout Eurasia, including in Turkey; Iran -- which is more popular in Turkey today than the United States; and Syria. Strategic realignment could wittingly or unwittingly cause Turks to abandon their longstanding premise that the United States remains the indispensable ally. Turkey's rejection by the EU, an outcome a growing number of Turks are coming to acknowledge as likely, will accelerate dynamics within Turkey for strategic realignment.

This need not happen. Turkey's strategic salience to American objectives across the Middle East and Eurasia has never been greater, especially as Turkey re-defines itself to account for a post-Cold War world that presents both countries with new challenges, opportunities, and a new range of convergent interests. But both sides urgently need to develop a new vision of the strategic future, beginning with the looming breakup of Iraq and the strong possibility that Turkey will fail to join Europe officially. The latter, ironically, might strengthen opportunities for a revivified, redefined U.S.-Turkey partnership.

Both sides need to pay urgent attention to the possibility that the U.S.-Turkey alliance could be in jeopardy. To this end, they should move to establish high-level joint working groups that are tasked with proposing concrete measures to safeguard the alliance and to ensure its relevance for the post-Cold War world. Turkey must also be made a central partner in fashioning a political settlement in Iraq and engage in regular consultations and joint planning to this end.

The U.S. must work with both the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq and the Turkish leadership to prevent the dispute over the oil-rich city of Kirkuk in northern Iraq (contested by the Kurds and by the Turkmen, who are supported by Turkey) from precipitating open warfare and possible Turkish intervention, which could further undermine America's alliance with Turkey.

Finally, bi-lateral, and eventually multilateral steps must be taken to fashion a "grand bargain" between the KRG and Turkey that includes specific and enforceable provisions to assure the KRG that Turkey will not invade Iraqi Kurdistan to forestall the possibility of an independent Kurdish state and to guarantee Turkey that the KRG will not permit the Kurdish radicals and separatists to use northern Iraq as a base of operations against Turkey.

It is neither in America's interest to "lose" Turkey, nor in Turkey's interest to "lose" the United States. But the dynamics that currently dominate this historic relationship are leading in this direction.

Rajan Menon is an Adjunct Fellow at Hudson Institute and the Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University. S. Enders Wimbush is Director of Hudson Institute's Center for Future Security Strategies. They recently published a Hudson Institute monograph entitled, "Is the U.S. Losing Turkey?"

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...7042301459.html

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Исследования авторов на на тему Американо-турецких отношений:

Is the United States "Losing Turkey"?

http://www.hudson.org/files/pdf_upload/Turkey%20PDF.pdf